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This paper presents a novel approach for changeable and privacy preserving face recognition. We first introduce a new method
of biometric matching using the sorted index numbers (SINs) of feature vectors. Since it is impossible to recover any of the
exact values of the original features, the transformation from original features to the SIN vectors is noninvertible. To address
the irrevocable nature of biometric signals whilst obtaining stronger privacy protection, a random projection-based method
is employed in conjunction with the SIN approach to generate changeable and privacy preserving biometric templates. The
eﬀectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated on a large generic data set, which contains images from several well-known
face databases. Extensive experimentation shows that the proposed solution may improve the recognition accuracy.
Copyright © 2009 Y. Wang and D. Hatzinakos. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
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1. Introduction
Biometric recognition has been an active research area in
the past two decades. Biometrics-based recognition systems
determine or confirm the identity of an individual based
on the physiological and/or behavioral characteristics [1]. A
wide variety of biometric modalities have been investigated
in the past. Examples of these biometrics include physio-
logical traits such as fingerprint, face, iris, and behavioral
characteristics such as gait and keystroke. Each biometric
has its strengths and weaknesses. The choice of a biometric
is dependent on the properties of the biometric and the
requirements of the specific application. Depending on
diﬀerent application context, a biometric system can operate
in identification mode or verification mode [1]. Figure 1
depicts the general block diagram of biometric recognition
systems.
During enrolment, a feature vector gi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N ,
where N is the total number of users, is extracted from
the biometric data of each user and stored in the system
database as templates. Biometric identification is a one-
to-many comparison to find an individual’s identity. In
identification mode, given an input feature vector p, if the
identity of p, Ip, is known to be in the system database,
that is, Ip ∈ {I1, I2, . . . , IN}, then Ip can be determined by
Ip = Ik = mink{S(p, gk)}, k = 1, 2, . . . ,N , where S denotes
the similarity measure. The performance of a biometric
identification system is usually evaluated in terms of correct
recognition rate (CRR).
A biometric verification system is a one-to-one match
that determines whether the claim of an individual is true.
At the verification stage, a feature vector p is extracted from
the biometric signal of the authentication individual Ip,
and compared with the stored template gk of the claimed
identity Ik through a similarity function S. The evaluation of
a verification system can be performed in terms of hypothesis
testing [2], H0: Ip = Ik, the claimed identity is correct;
H1: Ip /= Ik, the claimed identity is not correct. The decision
is made based on the system threshold τ, H0 is decided if
S(p, gk) ≤ τ, and H1 is decided if S(p, gk) > τ. A verification
system makes two types of errors: false accept (deciding H0
when H1 is true), and false reject (deciding H1 when H0 is
true). The performance of a biometric verification system is
usually evaluated in terms of false accept rate (FAR, P(H0 |
H1)), false reject rate (FRR, P(H1 | H0)), and equal error
rate (EER, operating point where FAR and FRR are equal).
The FAR and FRR are closely related functions of the system
decision threshold τ.
While biometric technology provides various advantages,
there exist some problems. In the first place, biometric data


































Figure 1: Block diagram of biometric recognition systems.
reflects the user’s physiological/behavior characteristics. If
the storage device of biometric templates is obtained by
an adversary, the user’s privacy may be compromised. The
biometric templates should be stored in a format such that
the user’s privacy is preserved even when the storage device
is attacked. Secondly, biometrics cannot be easily changed
and reissued if compromised due to the limited number
of biometric traits that a human has. This is of particular
importance in biometric verification scenarios. Ideally, just
like password, the biometrics should be changeable. The
users may use diﬀerent biometric representation for diﬀerent
applications. When the biometric template in one applica-
tion is compromised, the biometric signal itself is not lost
forever and a new biometric template can be issued.
A number of research works have been proposed in
the recent years to address the changeability and privacy
preserving problems of biometric systems. One approach is
to combine the biometric technology with cryptographic sys-
tems [3]. In a biometric cryptosystem, a randomly generated
cryptographic key is bound with the biometric features in a
secure way such that both the key and the biometric features
cannot be revealed if the stored template is compromised.
The cryptographic key can be retrieved if suﬃciently similar
biometric features are presented. Error correction algorithms
are usually employed to tolerate errors. Due to the binary
nature of cryptographic keys, such systems usually require
discrete representation of biometric data, such as minutia
points for fingerprints and iris code. However, the feature
vectors of many other biometrics, such as face, are usually
represented in continuous domain. Therefore, to apply such
a scheme, the continuous features need to be discretized first.
It should be noted that such methods produce changeable
cryptographic keys, while the biometric data is not change-
able. Furthermore, the security level of such methods still
needs to be further investigated [4, 5].
An alternative and eﬀective solution is to apply repeatable
and noninvertible transformations on the biometric features
[2]. With this method, every enrollment (or application)
can use a diﬀerent transform. When a biometric template
is compromised, a new one can be generated using a
new transform. In mathematical language, the recognition
problem can be formulated as follows. Given a biometric
feature vector u, the biometric template g is generated
through a generation function g = Gen(u, k). Diﬀerent
templates can be generated by varying the control factor k.
During verification, the same transformation is applied to
the authentication feature vector, g
′ = Gen(u′ , k), and the
matching is based on similarity measure in the transformed
domain, that is, S(g, g
′
). The major challenge here lies in
the diﬃculty of preserving the similarity measure in the
transformed domain, that is, S(g, g′) ≈ S(u, u′). Further,
to ensure the property of privacy protection, the generation
function Gen(u, k) should be nonfinvertible such that û =
Rec(g, k) /=u, where Rec(g, k) is the reconstruction function
when both the template g and control factor k are known.
Among various biometrics, face recognition has been
one of the most passive, natural, and noninvasive types of
biometrics. Such characteristics of face recognition make
it a good choice for some surveillance and monitoring
applications. It can also be used in supporting video
search and indexing, video-conferencing, interactive games,
physical access control, computer network login, and ATM.
Many face recognition methods have been proposed in the
literature, which can be roughly categorized into holistic
template matching-based system, geometrical local feature-
based system, and hybrid systems [6]. Promising results
have also been reported under controlled condition [7].
In general, the selection of a face recognition scheme is
dependent on the specific requirements of a given task [6].
Appearance-based approaches (such as principal component
analysis (PCA) and linear discriminant analysis (LDA)) that
treat the face image as a holistic pattern are among the most
successful methods [6, 8]. In this paper, we first introduce
a novel method for face recognition based on sorted index
numbers (SINs) of appearance-based facial features. Unlike
traditional face recognition methods which store either the
original image or facial features as templates, the proposed
method stores the SIN vectors only. A matching algorithm
is introduced to measure the similarity between two SIN
vectors. Because it is impossible to recover the exact values
of the original features based on the index numbers, the
SIN method is noninvertible. To further enhance the security
and address the irrevocable problem, intentional random
projection (RP) is applied prior to the sorting operation such
that the generated biometrics template is both changeable
and privacy preserving. Experimental results on a large data
set demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides a review of related works. Section 3
introduces the proposed method. Experimental results along
with detailed discussion are presented in Section 4. Finally,
conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2. Related Works
To address the privacy and irrevocability problem of biomet-
ric systems, many tentative solutions have been introduced
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in the literature using various biometrics. Among the
earliest eﬀorts, Soutar et al. [9] presented a correlation-
based method for fingerprint-based biometric verification,
and Davida et al. [10] proposed to store a set of user
specific error correction parameters as template for an iris-
based system. However, both of these two works are lack
of practical implementation and cannot provide rigorous
security guarantees [3].
Juels and Wattenberg [11] introduced a fuzzy commit-
ment scheme, which generalized and improved Davida’s
methods. The fuzzy commitment scheme assumes binary
representation of biometric features, and error correction
algorithms are used to tolerate errors due to the noisy
nature of biometric data. Hao et al. [12] presented a similar
scheme on an iris-based problem using a two-level error
correction mechanism. Later, a polynomial reconstruction-
based scheme, fuzzy vault, is proposed by Juels and Sudan
[13]. The fuzzy vault scheme assumes the biometric data
being represented by discrete features (e.g., minutia points
in fingerprints). In this scheme, error tolerance is achieved
by using the property of secret sharing, while the security is
obtained by hiding genuine points into randomly generated
chaﬀ points. A few implementation works of fuzzy vault have
been reported in [14, 15] based on fingerprints. Although the
paper proves that this scheme is secure in an information-
theoretic sense, it is clear that it is vulnerable to attacks via
record multiplicity [5]. Further drawbacks of the method
include high computational complexity and high error rate
[14, 15].
Dodis et al. [16] presented a theoretical work, fuzzy
extractor, for generation of cryptographic keys from noisy
biometric data using error correction code and hash func-
tions. Their paper also assumes the biometric features in
discrete domain. Diﬀerent constructions for three metric
spaces: Hamming distance, set diﬀerence, and edit distance
are introduced. Yagiz et al. [17] introduced a quantization-
based method for mapping of continuous face features to
discrete form and utilized a known secure construction for
secure key generation. However, Boyen [18] showed that the
fuzzy extractor may be not secure for multiple use of the
same biometrics data.
Kevenaar et al. [19] proposed a helper data system
for generation of renewable and privacy preserving binary
template. A set of fiducial points is first identified from six
key objects of human face, and Gabor filters are applied
to extract features from a small patch centered around
every fiducial point. The extracted features are discretized
by a thresholding method, and the reliability of each bit is
measured based on statistical analysis. The binary template
is generated by combining the extracted reliable bit with
a randomly generated key through an XOR operation, and
BCH code is applied for error correction. The indexes of the
selected reliable bit, the mean vector for feature thresholding,
the binary template, and the hash of the key are stored
for verification. Their experiments demonstrate that the
performance of the binary feature vectors is only degraded
slightly comparing with the original features. However, the
performance of their system depends on accurate localization
of key object and fiducial points.
Savvides et al. [20, 21] proposed an approach for cance-
lable biometric authentication in the encrypted domain. The
training face images are convolved with a random kernel first;
the transformed images are then used to synthesize a single
minimum average correlation energy filter. At the point of
verification, query face image is convolved with the same
random kernel and then correlates with the stored filer to
examine the similarity. If the storage card is ever attacked,
a new random kernel may be applied. They show that the
performance is not aﬀected by the random kernel. However,
it is not clear how the system preserves privacy if the random
kernel is known by an adversary. The original biometrics may
be retrieved through deconvolution if the random kernel is
known.
Boult [22] introduced a method for face-based revocable
biometrics based on robust distance measures. In this
scheme, the face features are first transformed through scal-
ing and translation, and the resulting values are partitioned
into two parts, the integer part and the fractional part. The
integer part is encrypted using Public Key (PK) algorithms,
and the fractional part is retained for local approxima-
tion. A user-specific passcode is included to address the
revocation problem. In a subsequent paper [23], a similar
scheme is applied on a fingerprint problem, and detailed
security analysis is provided. Their methods demonstrate
both improvement in accuracy and privacy. However, it is
assumed that the private key cannot be obtained by an
imposter. In the case of known private key and transform
parameters, the biometrics features can be exactly recovered.
Teoh et al. [24] introduced a two-factor scheme, Bio-
Hashing method, which produces changeable non-invertible
biometric template, and also claimed good performance,
near zero EER. In BioHashing, a feature vector u ∈ Rn is
first extracted from the user’s biometric data. For each user,
a user-specific transformation matrix R ∈ Rn×m,m ≤ n, is
generated randomly (associated with a key or token), and
the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization method is applied
to R, such that all the columns of R are orthonormal. The
extracted feature vector u is then transformed by x = RTu,
and the resulting vector x is quantized by bi = 0, if xi < t,
and bi = 1, if xi ≥ t, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, where t is a predefined
threshold value and usually set to 0. The binary vector b
is stored as the template. The technique has been applied
on various biometric traits [25, 26] and demonstrates zero
or near zero equal error rate in ideal case; that is, both
the biometric data and the key are legitimate. In the stolen
key scenario, the BioHashing method usually degrades the
verification accuracy. Lumini and Nanni [27] introduce some
ideas to improve the performance of BioHashing in case of
stolen key by utilizing diﬀerent threshold values and fuse the
scores. However, as shown in [28], as well as the experimental
results in this paper, even in the both legitimate scenario, the
performance of BioHashing technique is highly dependent
on the characteristics and dimensionality of the extracted
features.
In summary, existing works either can not provide robust
privacy protection, or sacrifice recognition accuracy for
privacy preservation. In this paper, we propose a new method
for changeable and privacy preserving template generation
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using random projection and sorted index numbers. As
it will be shown, the proposed method is also capable of
improving the recognition accuracy.
3. Methodology
This section presents the proposed method for privacy
preserving face recognition. An overview of the sorted index
numbers (SINs) method as well as the similarity measure
algorithm is first introduced. Next, the analysis of the SIN
algorithm is provided in detail. The random projection-
based changeable biometrics scheme is then described.
Finally, privacy analysis of the proposed method is presented.
3.1. Overview of SIN Method. The proposed method utilizes
sorted index numbers instead of the original facial features
as templates for recognition. The procedure of creating the
proposed SIN feature vector is as follows.
(1) Extract feature vector w ∈ Rn from the input face
image z.
(2) Compute u = w − w, where w is the mean feature
vector calculated from the training data.
(3) Sort the feature vector u in descending order, and
store the corresponding index numbers in a new
vector g.
(4) The generated vector g ∈ Zn that contains the sorted
index numbers is stored as template for recognition.
For example, given u = {u1,u2,u3,u4,u5,u6}, the sorted
vector in descending order is ĝ = {u4,u6,u2,u1,u3,u5}, then
the template is g = {4, 6, 2, 1, 3, 5}.
The method for computing the similarity between two
SIN vectors is as follows.
(1) Given two SIN feature vectors g ∈ Zn and p ∈ Zn,
where g denotes the template vector, and p denotes
the probe vector. Start from the first element g1 of g.
(2) Search for the corresponding element in p, that is,
pj = g1. Record d1 = j − 1, where j is the index
number in p.
(3) Eliminate the obtained pj in the previous step from
p, and obtain p1 = {p1, p2, . . . , pj−1, pj+1, . . . , pn}.
(4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 on the following elements of g
until gn−1. Record d2,d3, . . . ,dn−1.
(5) The similarity measure of g and p is computed as
S(g, p) =∑n−1i=1 di.
Illustration Example.
(1) For two SIN feature vectors g = {4, 6, 2, 1, 3, 5} and
p = {2, 5, 3, 6, 1, 4}, we first search the 1st element
g1 = 4, and find that p6 = 4. Therefore d1 = 6− 1 =
5. Eliminate p6 from p and we form a new vector of
p1 = {2, 5, 3, 6, 1}.
(2) Search the 2nd element g2 = 6, and find that p14 = 6.
Therefore d2 = 4 − 1 = 3. Eliminate p14 from p1 and
form a new vector of p2 = {2, 5, 3, 1}.
(3) Search the 3rd element g3 = 2, and find that p21 = 2.
Therefore d3 = 1 − 1 = 0. Eliminate p21 from p2 and
form a new vector of p3 = {5, 3, 1}.
(4) Search the 4th element g4 = 1, and find that p33 = 1.
Therefore d4 = 3 − 1 = 2. Eliminate p33 from p3 and
form a new vector of p4 = {5, 3}.
(5) Search the 5th element g5 = 3, and find that p42 = 1.
Therefore d5 = 2− 1 = 1.
(6) Compute S(g, p) =∑n−1i=1 di = 5 + 3 + 0 + 2 + 1 = 11.
3.2. Methodology Analysis. To understand the underlying
rationale of the proposed algorithm, we first look into
an alternative presentation of the method, named Pairwise
Relational Discretization (PRD). The relative relation of
diﬀerent bins has been used to represent histogram shape
in [29]. Here, the pairwise relative relation of features is
used for Euclidean distance approximation. The procedure
of producing the PRD feature vector is as follows.
(1) Extract feature vector w ∈ Rn from the input face
image z.
(2) Compute u = w − w, where w is the mean feature
vector calculated from the training data.
(3) Compute binary representation of u by comparing






1, ui ≥ uj ,
0, ui < uj .
(1)
(4) Concatenate all the generated binary bits into one
vector b = {b12, . . . , b1n, b23, . . . , b2n, b34, . . . , bn−1,n}.
Store the binary vector b as template for recognition.
The similarity measure of the PRD method is based
on Hamming distance. Unlike traditional discretization
method, which quantizes individual elements based on some
predefined quantization levels, the proposed method takes
the global characteristics of the feature vectors into consider-
ation. This is interpreted by comparing the pairwise relation
of all groups of two elements in the vector. The intuition
behind the idea is to consider an n-dimensional space as
combinations of 2-dimensional planes. In n-dimensional
subspace, when the similarity of two vectors is evaluated by
Euclidean distance, each element of the vectors is treated
as coordinates in the corresponding basis {h1, h2, . . . , hn},
and the similarity is based on the spatial closeness. The
elements are essentially the projection coeﬃcients of the
vector onto each basis (i.e., lines). Here, instead of projecting
onto lines, we explore the projection onto 2D planes. Figure 2
oﬀers a diagrammatic illustration of the PRD method.
For two points in n-dimensional subspace, if they are
spatially close to each other, then in large number of 2D
planes, their projection location should be close to each
other, that is, small Hamming distance, and vise versa.
Therefore, the Euclidean distance between two vectors can








































































Figure 2: Diagram of Pairwise Relational Discretization (PRD) method.
be approximated by the Hamming distance between the
corresponding PRD vectors. The mean centralization step
is to leverage the significance of each element such that no
single dimension will overwhelm others. The discretization
step partitions a plane into two regions by comparing the
pairwise relation. It reduces the sensitivity of the variation
of individual elements and therefore possibly provides better
error tolerance. Figure 3 shows the intra-class and inter-class
distribution of 100 PCA coeﬃcients based on 1000 randomly
selected images from the experimental data set. The PCA
vectors are normalized to unit length, and Euclidean distance
and SIN distance are used as dissimilarity measure. Note that
the size of the overlapping area of the intra-class and inter-
class distributions indicates the recognition error. It can be
observed that the SIN method produces smaller error than
the original features, therefore will possibly provide better
recognition performance.
A major drawback of the PRD method is the high
dimensionality of the generated binary PRD vector. For an
n-dimensional vector, the generated binary vector b will
have a size of n(n − 1)/2. For example, for a feature vector
with n = 100, the PRD vector will have a size of 4950.
This problem introduces high storage and computational
requirements. This is particularly important for applications
with high processing speed demand. To improve this, we note
that the PRD method is based on pairwise relation of all the
vector elements, and the same information can be exactly
preserved from the sorted index numbers of the vector; that
is, any single bit in b can be derived from the SIN vector.
Let g and p denote the SIN vector of template and probe
images, respectively, bg and bp represent the corresponding










where H(bg , bp) and S(g, p) denote the Hamming distance
and SIN distance, respectively, and di, i = 1, . . . ,n, represents



















Figure 3: Comparison of intraclass and interclass distribution using
Euclidean and SIN distances.
Proof of (2). Since g and bg are derived from the same feature
vector, in bg , there are n − 1 bits that are associated with
the first element of g, g1. If pj = g1, where j is the index
number of the corresponding element in p, then all the index
numbers to the left of pj will have diﬀerent bit values in
bp, that is, d1 = j − 1. It should be noted that since the
Hamming distance for all the bits associated with pj = g1 has
been computed, the pj element should be removed for the
calculation of next iteration. After the Hamming distances
for all the elements in g and p are computed, the sum of them
will correspond to the Hamming distance of bg and bp, that
is, H(bg , bp) = S(g, p) =
∑n−1
i=1 di.
Equation (2) shows that the proposed SIN and PRD
methods produce exactly the same results. To test the
eﬀectiveness of SIN over PRD in computational complexity,
we performed experiments on a computer with Intel Core2
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CPU 2.66 GHz. With an original feature vector of dimension-
ality 100, the average time for PRD feature extraction and
matching is 26.2 milliseconds, while the SIN method only
consumes less than 0.9 milliseconds.
3.3. Changeable Biometrics. To address the changeability
problem in biometric verification systems, one solution is
to scramble the order of the features before the sorting
operation. However, the security of such method is the same
as the encryption/decryption key method, where the original
SIN vectors will be obtained if the scrambling rule is compro-
mised. In this paper, for the purpose of comparative study, we
adopt the random projection-(RP-) based scheme as in [24].
Depending on the requirements of the application, the
changeable biometric system can be implemented in two
scenarios: user-independent projection and user-dependent
projection. In the user-independent scenario, all the users
use the same matrix for projection. This matrix can be
controlled by the application provider, and therefore the
users do not need to carry the matrix (or equivalently
a key for matrix generation) for verification. The user-
dependent scenario is a two-factor authentication scheme,
and requires the presentation of both the biometrics data and
projection matrix at the time and point of verification. In
both scenarios, the biometric template can be regenerated by
changing the projection matrix.
The theory of random projection is first introduced by
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma [30].
Lemma 1 (J-L lemma). For any 0 <  < 1, and an integer s,
letm be a positive integer such thatm ≥ m0 = O(−2logs). For
any set B of s points in Rn, there exists a map f:Rn → Rm such
that for all u, v ∈ B,
(1− )‖u− v‖2 ≤ ∥∥ f (u)− f (v)∥∥2 ≤ (1− )‖u− v‖2.
(3)
This lemma states that the pairwise distance between any
two vectors in the Euclidean space can be preserved up to
a factor of , when projected onto a random m-dimension
subspace. Random projection has been used as a dimension
reduction tool in face recognition [31], image processing
[32], and a privacy preserving tool in data mining [33] and
biometrics [24]. The implementation of random projection
can be carried out by generating a matrix of size n×m,m ≤ n,
with each entry an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variable, and applying the Gram-Schmidt
method for orthonormalization. Note that when m = n, it
becomes the random orthonormal transformation (ROT).
In user-independent scenario, for two facial feature vectors
u ∈ Rn and v ∈ Rn, since the same ROT matrix R ∈ Rn×n is























= ‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2 − 2uTv
= ‖u− v‖2.
(4)
It can be seen that the ROT transform exactly preserves the
Euclidean distance of original features. When the projected
dimensionality is m < n, although exact preservation can
not be obtained, the pairwise distance can be approximately
preserved. The larger the m, the better the preservation. Since
the SIN method also approximates the Euclidean distance,
the SIN vectors obtained after RP can also approximately
preserve the similarity between two original vectors.
In the user-dependent scenario, diﬀerent users are associ-
ated with distinct projection matrices. The FAR corresponds
to the probability of deciding H0 when H1 is true, P(H0 |
H1), and the FRR corresponds to P(H1 | H0). Note that for
the FRR, even in case of a user-dependent scenario, the same
orthogonal matrix R is used for the same user, and hence
the situation is the same as the user-independent scenario.
Therefore we only need to analyze the influence of diﬀerent
projection matrix over the FAR.
Let Ru and Rv represent the RP matrices for feature
vectors u and v, respectively. Let x = RTu u and y = RTv v,
and g and p denote the SIN vectors for x and y, respectively.
Due to the randomness of RP, the total number of possible
outputs for g and p is equal to the number of permutations
m!. Let γ denote the number of index permutations that have
a distance of less than τ to the vector g, then the probability
of p being falsely identified by g is P(H0 | H1) = γ/m!.
It can be seen that the probability of false accept depends
on the characteristics and dimensionality of the features. If
the features are well separated, that is, smaller γ value, with
relatively higher dimensionality, the false accept rate will be
small. The above analysis in user-dependent scenario also
applies if the biometrics data is stolen by an adversary, since
the v vector can be exactly the same as u. This also explains
the changeability of the method.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the distance between
two feature vectors using user-independent and user-
dependent random projections. We randomly selected two
PCA features vectors (n = 100) of the same subject from
the employed data set, performed the same key and diﬀerent
key scenario 2000 times, and plotted the distribution of
the Euclidean distance and SIN distance, respectively, at
diﬀerent projection dimensions. The PCA feature vectors are
normalized to unit length, and the distances are normalized
by dividing the largest value, respectively, 2 for Euclidean
distance and m(m − 1)/2 for SIN. It can be observed
that by applying the same key, the mean of the Euclidean
distance in the projected domain is centered around the
original Euclidean distance, and the variance of the distances
decreases as the projected dimensionality increases. This
demonstrates better distance preservation at higher projec-
tion dimension. When diﬀerent keys are applied, the mean
of the distance distribution shifts to the right, that is larger
distance. The clear separation of the distribution indicates
the changeability of the proposed method.
3.4. Privacy Analysis. Since the SIN method only stores
the index numbers of the sorted feature vector u, the
transformation from u to the corresponding SIN vector g
is non-invertible. There is no eﬀective reconstruction being
possible to recover the exact values of u from g. The most an
adversary can do is to estimate the values of u based on some
statistics or his/her own features. By using such method, an
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Figure 4: Gaussian approximation of the distribution of (a) normalized Euclidean distance (NED), (c) normalized SIN distance (NSD),
with n = 100, m = 80. Distribution of (b) NED, and (d) NSD, at diﬀerent projection dimensionality in same key and diﬀerent key scenarios.
adversary can only produce an approximation of the original
features. For RP, when the projected dimensionality m is
smaller than the dimensionality n of the original features,
even the worst case that the projection matrix is known by an
adversary, an estimation will produce an approximation of
the original features with variance inverse proportional to m,
that is, the smaller the m, the larger the estimation variance
[33]. Since both the RP and SIN methods are non-invertible
transformations, the combination of these two is expected to
produce stronger privacy protection.
To analyze the privacy preserving properties of the pro-
posed method, we introduce the following privacy measures:
Definition 1. A feature vector u ∈ Rn is called privacy






1− [1− xi]h(1− xi), xi = Var(ui − ûi)Var(ui) , (5)
where var(·) denotes variance, ûi is the estimated value of
element ui, and h(x) is unit step function, that is, h(x) = 1 if
x ≥ 0 and h(x) = 0 otherwise. The function h(x) is utilized
to regulate the significance of all the elements, such that the
variance ratio of any element is maximum 1.
Using the variance of diﬀerence between the actual and
perturbed values has been widely adopted as a privacy
measure for individual attributes in data mining [34].
Similarly, here we take the variance of diﬀerence between
the original and estimated values as a measure of the privacy
protection of individual elements. When the variance ratio
of any attribute is greater or equal to 1, that is, Var(ui −
ûi) ≥ Var(ui), then the estimation of that attribute essentially
provides no useful information, and the attribute is strongly
protected. The element-wise privacy level α measures the
average privacy protection of individual elements. The
greater the α value, the better the privacy protection.
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Besides measuring the privacy protection of the indi-
vidual elements, it is also important to measure the global
characteristics of the feature vectors such that the estimated
vector is not close to the original one up to certain similarity
functions. In [35], it is shown that any arbitrary distance
functions can be approximately mapped to Euclidean dis-
tance domain through certain algorithms. In this paper, we
take the squared Euclidean distance between the estimated
and original feature vectors as a measure of privacy.
Definition 2. A feature vector u ∈ Rn is called privacy











where E(·) denotes expectation, ‖ · ‖ denotes the squared
Euclidean distance, and r is any random vector in the
estimation feature space. If the average distance between
the estimated and original vector is approaching the average
distance between any random vector and the original vector,
then the estimated vector essentially exhibits randomness,
and therefore does not disclose information about u; that is,
the larger the β, the better privacy. Without loss of generality,
we assume that all the vectors have unit length. Since the
vectors are centralized to zero mean, the average distance




















i=1 E(ri)E(ui) = 0, since ri is independent
of ui and has zero mean. Therefore, for unit length vectors,









Figure 5 shows the privacy measures α and β as functions
of projected dimension m, with the original dimensionality
n = 100. Figure 5(a) plots the results generated from 1000
random unit vectors, and Figure 5(b) is obtained from 1000
randomly selected PCA feature vectors in the experimental
data set. The random vectors are generated with each element
an i.i.d. Gaussian random variable, followed by normaliza-
tion to unit length. The PCA vectors are normalized to have
the same variance and unit length. The estimation û of an
original vector u is performed as follows. For an original
vector u with RP matrix R, we obtain the SIN vector g
by g = sort(RTu), where sort denotes the operation of
getting the sorted index numbers. Given the worst case that
an adversary obtains g and R, he can estimate u by using
a randomly generated unit vector e according to an i.i.d.
Gaussian distribution, mapping to the estimated vector ê
based on g, then computing û = RRT ê, and normalizing to

















































Figure 5: Privacy measure as a function of dimensionality. (a)
random vectors, (b) PCA feature vectors.
element-wise and vector-wise privacy levels improve as the
projected dimension decreases.
To provide some insight into the privacy protection prop-
erty of the proposed method, we compare the reconstructed
image with the original image through diﬀerent methods in
Figure 6. The images are randomly selected from the FERET
database [36, 37]. A PCA vector u is first extracted from
image z (Figure 6(a)). A new vector is then generated by
x = RTu u, where Ru is a random projection matrix, and
the sorted index numbers of x are stored in a SIN vector
g. Here the dimensionality of PCA is selected as n = 100,
and the projection dimension is m = 50. Assuming the
worst case that g and Ru are all compromised, an adversary
can only reconstruct the original image based on a vector v,
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which is either a PCA feature vector of some other subjects,
or a randomly generated vector. The reconstruction can
be performed by first sorting and mapping v to another
vector v˜ based on g, and followed by ẑ = Ψ(Ruv˜ + ΨTz).
Figure 6(a) shows an original image z and Figure 6(b) is
the reconstructed image from its first 100 PCA coeﬃcients
u. The reconstruction is performed by ẑ = Ψ(u + ΨTz),
where Ψ is the PCA projection matrix, and z is the mean
image obtained from the training set. It is obvious that the
PCA approach cannot preserve privacy since the original
visual information is very well approximated. Figures 6(d)
and 6(f) are the reconstructed images from the features of
images, Figures 6(c) and 6(d), respectively, while Figure 6(g)
and Figure 6(h) are reconstructed from randomly generated
vectors, all using the SIN vector g of image Figure 6(a). All
the reconstructed images demonstrate large distortion from
the original image. The results in Figure 6 are meant to
provide some insight into the privacy preserving property
of the proposed method. It can be seen that the original
values of the feature vectors can not be recovered, and
an estimation can only produce a distorted version of the
original image, which has a significant visual diﬀerence from
the original one. The above analysis, although not exact in
the mathematical sense, illustrates that the privacy of the user
can be protected by using the proposed method.
4. Experimental Results
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we
conducted experiments on a generic data set that consists
of face images from several well-known databases [38]. In
this section, we first give a description of the employed
data set. The adopted feature extraction methods are then
briefly discussed. Finally, the experimental results along with
detailed discussion are presented.
4.1. Generic Data Set. To approach more realistic face
recognition applications, this paper tests the eﬀectiveness
of the proposed method using a generic data set, in which
the intrinsic properties of the human subjects are trained
from subjects other than those to be recognized. The
generic database was initially organized for the purpose
of demonstrating the eﬀectiveness of the generic learning
framework [38]. It originally contains 5676 images of 1020
subjects from 5 well-known databases, FERET [36, 37], PIE
[39], AR [40], Aging [41], and BioID [42]. All images are
aligned and normalized based on the coordinate information
of some facial feature points. The details of image selection
can be found in [38].
For preprocessing, the color images are first transformed
to gray-scale images by taking the luminance component in
YCbCr color space. All images are preprocessed according
to the recommendation of the FERET protocol, which
includes: (1) images are rotated and scaled so that the
centers of the eyes are placed on specific pixels and the
image size is 150 × 130; (2) a standard mask is applied
to remove non-face portions; (3) histogram equalized and
image normalized to have zero mean and unit standard
deviation. After preprocessing, the face images are converted
Table 1: Generic data set configuration.
Database No. of No. of No. of
subjects images per subject images
FERET 750 ≥3 3881
AR 119 4 476
Aging 63 ≥3 276
BioID 20 ≥6 227
PIE 68 12 816
Total 1020 ≥3 5676
to an image vector of dimension J = 17154. Table 1 illustrates
the configuration of the whole data set. Figure 7 shows some
example images from the generic data set.
4.2. Feature Extraction. To study the eﬀects of diﬀerent
feature extractors on the performance of proposed methods,
we compare Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and
Kernel Direct Discriminant Analysis (KDDA). PCA is an
unsupervised learning technique which provides an optimal,
in the least mean square error sense, representation of
the input in a lower-dimensional space. In the Eigenfaces
method [43], given a training set Z = {Zi}Ci=1, containing C
classes with each class Zi = {zi j}Cij=1 consisting of a number
of face images zi j , a total of M =
∑C
i=1 Ci images, the PCA is











zi j − z
)(
zi j − z
)T
, (9)
where z = (1/M)∑Ci=1
∑Ci
j=1 zi j is the average of the
ensemble. The Eigenfaces are the first N(≤ M) eigenvectors
corresponding to the largest eigenvalues, denoted as Ψ. The
original image is transformed to the N-dimension face space
by a linear mapping
yi j = ΨT
(
zi j − z
)
. (10)
PCA produces the most expressive subspace for face
representation but is not necessarily the most discriminating
one. This is due to the fact that the underlying class
structure of the data is not considered in the PCA technique.
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is a supervised learning
technique that provides a class specific solution. It produces
the optimal feature subspace in such a way that the ratio of
between-class scatter and within-class scatter is maximized.
Although LDA-based algorithms are superior to PCA-based
methods in some cases, it is shown in [44] that PCA
outperforms LDA when the training sample size is small
and the training images is less representative of the testing
subjects. This is confirmed in [38] that PCA performs much
better than LDA in a generic learning scenario, where the
image samples of the human subjects are not available for
training. It was also shown in [38] that KDDA outperforms
other techniques in most of the cases. Therefore we also
adopt KDDA in this paper.
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Figure 6: Comparison of original image with reconstructed images.
Figure 7: Example images for identification (top row) and verification (bottom row).
KDDA was proposed by Lu et al. [45] to address the non-
linearities in complex face patterns. Kernel-based solution
find a nonlinear transform from the original image space
RJ to a high-dimensional feature space F using a nonlinear
function φ(·). In the transformed high-dimensional feature
space F , the convexity of the distribution is expected to be
retained so that traditional linear methodologies such as PCA
and LDA can be applied. The optimal nonlinear discriminant
feature representation of z can be obtained by
y = Θ · ν(φ(z)), (11)
where Θ is a matrix representing the found kernel discrimi-
nant subspace, and ν(φ(z)) is the kernel vector of the input
z. The detailed implementation algorithm of KDDA can be
found in [45].
4.3. Experimental Results on Face Identification. For face
identification, we use all the 5676 images in the data set for
experiments. A set of 2836 images from 520 human subjects
was randomly selected for training, and the rest of 2840
images from 500 subjects for testing. There is no overlap
between the training and testing subjects and images. The
test is performed on an exhaustive basis, such that each time,
one image is taken from the test set as probe image, while
the rest of the images in the test set as gallery images. This is
repeated until all the images in the test set were used as the
probe once. The classification is based on nearest neighbor.
Table 2 compares the correct recognition rate (CRR) of
SIN method with Euclidean and Cosine distance measures
at diﬀerent dimensions. It can be observed that at higher
dimensionality, the SIN method may boost the recognition
accuracy of PCA significantly, while maintain the good per-
formance of the stronger feature extractor KDDA. The PCA
method projects images to directions with highest variance,
but not the discriminant ones. This will become more severe
in large image variations due to illumination, expression,
pose, and aging. When computing the similarity between
two PCA vectors, the distance measure is sensitive to the
variation of individual element, particularly those directions
corresponding to noise. The SIN method, on the other hand,
reduces this sensitivity by simply comparing the relative
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Table 2: Face identification results (in %).
PCA KDDA
Dim. Euc. Cos. SIN Euc. Cos. SIN
20 56.30 56.31 52.32 40.04 41.09 34.86
40 60.09 61.09 61.94 61.44 65.28 61.94
60 63.52 62.96 66.06 71.73 74.86 74.68
80 64.37 64.44 68.84 81.76 83.27 81.76
100 65.14 65.18 71.27 79.05 80.42 80.07
Table 3: Verification data set configuration.
Database No. of No. of No. of
subjects images per subject images
FERET 750 ≥2 3029
AR 119 4 476
Aging 63 ≥3 276
BioID 20 ≥6 227
PIE 68 ≥8 658
Total 1020 ≥2 4666
Table 4: Obtained EER (in %) for face verification.
PCA KDDA
Dim. Euc. Cos. SIN Euc. Cos. SIN
20 20.05 19.23 13.78 25.22 20.42 20.97
40 19.09 17.81 11.46 21.49 16.22 14.54
60 18.52 17.42 10.28 18.80 13.41 10.97
80 18.50 17.15 9.72 10.96 9.90 7.19
100 18.20 16.94 9.46 10.41 8.84 6.52
relation of the projections, and therefore possibly provides
better error tolerance. In the case of strong extractors such
as KDDA, the SIN method will approximate the distance
between two vectors and hence preserves the recognition
accuracy.
4.4. Experimental Results on Face Verification. For face verifi-
cation, we exclude image samples with large pose variation
(>15◦) and select 4666 images from 1020 subjects for our
experiments. Table 3 illustrates the detailed configuration of
the verification data set. In our experiments, we randomly
select 2388 images from 520 subjects as the training set, and
2278 images of the rest 500 subjects as the testing set. There is
no overlap between the training and the testing subjects and
images. The evaluation was also performed on an exhaustive
basis, where every single image is used as a template once,
and the rest of the images in the test set as the probe images.
Table 4 compares the obtained equal error rate (EER)
of SIN with Euclidean and Cosine distance at diﬀerent
dimensions when PCA and KDDA are used as feature
extractors. In general, the Cosine metric outperforms the
Euclidean distance measure, and the proposed SIN method
improves both the verification accuracy of PCA and KDDA
at almost all dimensions. This further demonstrates that the
sorted index numbers indeed oﬀer better error tolerance and
provide more discriminant representation.
4.5. Changeable Face Verification. To enhance the privacy
protection level as well as addressing the irrevocable problem
of biometric verification systems, this paper adopts the
random projection method. For the purpose of comparative
study, we compared the performance of the proposed
method with that of the BioHashing (BH) technique in this
paper. For the BH method, as illustrated in [24], each of the
generated BH code should have a probability of 50% to be 1
or 0. To achieve this, we centralize all the feature vectors by
subtracting the mean, and then compare with the threshold
value t = 0.
In the experiments, the same data set as the one for face
verification is employed. The images for training and testing
are also exactly the same as those for face verification. To
minimize the eﬀect of randomness, all the experiments were
performed 5 times, and the average of the results is reported.
Table 5 gives the obtained EER of BH and SIN methods
in both user-independent and user-dependent scenarios at
diﬀerent projected dimension m, with the dimensionality of
the original features set to n = 100.
In the user-independent scenario, all the users apply the
same RP matrix. In the user-dependent scenario, diﬀerent
users have distinct RP matrices. The user-dependent scenario
is essentially a two-factor scheme, and it requires correct
presentation of both the RP matrix (or a generation key)
and biometrics data. The proposed user-dependent scheme
assumes that the RP matrix and the biometrics data can
not be stolen at the same time. If the RP matrix is stolen,
the evaluation can be performed by considering the worst
case that the key of all the users is stolen by others. This is
equivalent to use the same random projection matrix for all
the users. Therefore, the performance of stolen key case will
be the same as the user-independent scenario. If only the
biometric data is stolen, then the performance will be the
same as the both-legitimate case due to the randomness of
the transformation, as discussed in Section 3.3.
The experimental results in Table 5 show that the
proposed SIN method outperforms the BH method in
both user-dependent and user-independent scenarios, at all
dimensions, when PCA and KDDA are used as feature
extractors. Although the previous works on BH demonstrate
near zero EER in both-legitimate cases, the performance of
it depends on the characteristics of the data and feature
extractors. For an m bit BioHash code b, assume that each
bit in b is independent, let τ be the threshold value in terms
of Hamming distance, then the probability of false accept






/2n. This probability depends on
two factors, the system threshold τ and dimension m, which
reflect the separability and characteristics of the data and
feature extractors. Figure 8 shows the intra-class and inter-
class distribution of the generic data set. It can be observed
that the SIN method provides better distribution separation
than the BH method, in both user-independent and user-
dependent scenarios, with both PCA and KDDA feature
extractors. This demonstrates that the proposed SIN method






































































Figure 8: Intra-class and inter-class distributions of SIN and BH, using PCA and KDDA feature extractors, in both user-independent and
user-dependent scenarios.
Table 5: Obtained EER (in %) for changeable face verification.
PCA KDDA
User-dependent User-independent User-dependent User-independent
Dim. BH SIN BH SIN BH SIN BH SIN
20 22.13 16.92 25.25 20.82 18.77 12.96 18.63 13.58
40 17.80 13.44 21.43 18.69 13.03 7.70 13.96 9.23
60 15.54 11.76 19.24 17.63 9.85 5.68 10.92 7.38
80 14.38 10.76 18.34 17.18 7.97 4.54 9.37 6.64
100 12.98 9.89 17.79 16.83 6.84 3.83 8.63 6.05
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Figure 9: Obtained EER and ROC plots for PCA and KDDA (UI: user-independent, UD: user-dependent).
provides more discriminant representation than the simple
thresholding method in BioHashing.
For a complete comparison, Figure 9 plots the EER of all
verification scenarios as well as the Receiver Operating Curve
(ROC) for both feature extractors at dimensionality of 100.
The ROC curve is plotted by Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR,
complement of FRR) against FAR, and the axes are log scaled
for better visualization. When the SIN method is applied on
facial features directly, it improves the verification accuracy
for both feature extractors. In the user-independent scenario
of PCA, the verification accuracy is degraded compared to
apply SIN directly on PCA features. This is possibly due
to the randomness of RP changes the inherent pairwise
relations of original PCA features, and therefore the SIN
method can not produce more discriminant representation,
but approximate the Euclidean distance only. In spite of this,
it can be observed that by integrating the RP transform, the
proposed SIN method introduces changeability, enhances
privacy protection, and achieves better performance than
original features, as well as existing work.
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Figure 10: Experimental results based on reconstructed images.
4.6. Experimental Results on Reconstructed Images. To fur-
ther study the privacy preserving property of the pro-
posed method, we performed experiments on reconstructed
images from the estimated PCA coeﬃcients. The original
n-dimensional PCA features are projected onto an m-
dimensional vector, and the resulting SIN vector is stored as
templates. Considering the worst case that the SIN vector, the
random projection matrix, the PCA transformation matrix,
and the mean image are all obtained, an adversary can
reconstruct the original image using the method discussed
in Section 3.4. The adversary may then try to compromise
the user using the reconstructed image. Figure 10 reports the
false acceptance rate obtained when the reconstructed images
are utilized to compromise the original PCA-based system.
The dimensionality of the PCA vectors is n = 100. All the
PCA vectors are normalized to unit length, and Euclidean
distance is adopted as dissimilarity measure. The system
threshold values are selected based on the FAR of the original
system. It can be observed that the false acceptance rate
decreases as the projection dimension m decreases. This is
consistent with our analysis in Section 3.4 that the privacy
preserving level increases as m decreases. It can be also
seen that the security level is also dependent on the system
threshold of the original system, which is closely related to
the requirement of the application. In general, applications
that require a higher level of security will have a smaller
threshold, that is, smaller FAR. In such, the proposed method
can provide stronger privacy protection even at a relatively
higher projected dimension. On the other hand, when the τ
is large, it requires smaller projected dimension m to achieve
higher level of security. However, as shown in Figure 9, since
the recognition accuracy also degrades as the m getting
smaller, the proposed method has a tradeoﬀ between privacy
and accuracy. The balancing point of these two is dependent
on the requirement of the application.
5. Conclusion
This paper introduced a novel approach for addressing
the challenging problem of changeable and privacy pre-
serving face recognition. The proposed method is based
on random projection (RP) in conjunction with a sorted
index numbers (SINs) approach. A similarity measure is
introduced for computing the distance between two SIN
vectors. Two diﬀerent scenarios, namely, user-independent
and user-dependent transformation are discussed. In the
user-independent scenario, all the users apply the same
RP matrix for transformation. Due to the distance pre-
serving property of RP, the similarity of features in the
transformed domain can be approximately preserved. The
user-dependent scenario is a two-factor authenticator that
utilizes user-specific RP matrix for transformation. In both
scenarios, the biometrics template can be changed by varying
the RP matrix.
Experimental results on a large database demonstrate
that the SIN method may improve the recognition accuracy
of the original features in both identification and verifica-
tion scenarios. The combination of RP and SIN method
outperforms comparable existing works for all scenarios and
feature extractors. In conclusion, the proposed method may
improve recognition accuracy, preserve the user’s privacy,
and generate changeable biometric template. Although we
focus on face recognition problem in this paper, the proposed
method is general for continuous domain features, and it
is expected that such method can also be applied to other
biometrics.
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